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Social media have become more and more relevant political 
communication arenas. Social media are used by various 
political organizations (Nitschke, Donges, & Schade, 2016), 
they have evolved to key territories for populist actors 
(Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016), and their impor-
tance in election campaigns as well as their influence on 
election results is highly debated (Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 
2017).
These trends seem to be in line with the mediatization of 
politics thesis, which states that the media and mediated 
communication are becoming increasingly important in poli-
tics and increasingly influencing political processes 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). 
Several authors have discussed the consequences of the 
growing importance of social media (Chadwick, 2013; 
Klinger & Svensson, 2015; Schulz, 2014; van Dijck & Poell, 
2013). Although first empirical studies have analyzed the 
“social mediatization” in organizations (e.g., Olsson & 
Eriksson, 2016), most empirical studies on the mediatization 
of politics still focus on traditional news media (Elmelund-
Præstekær, Hopmann, & Nørgaard, 2011; Kepplinger, 2002; 
Maurer & Pfetsch, 2014; Strömbäck, 2011; van Aelst et al., 
2008; van Aelst & Walgrave, 2011; Zeh & Hopmann, 2013). 
On one hand, this is convincing, as the news media still dom-
inate Western media environments (e.g., Klinger & Svensson, 
2015; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). In addition, mediatiza-
tion focuses on long-term processes (Kepplinger, 2002; 
Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014), and 
social media are a relatively new phenomenon. On the other 
hand, media environments have changed dramatically since 
the emergence of social media (Chadwick, 2013), and within 
a short time period, political actors, organizations, journal-
ists, and citizens have integrated social media into their 
media repertoires (Broersma & Graham, 2013; Gulati & 
Williams, 2013; Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, 
& Nielsen, 2017; Nitschke et al., 2016). Thus, even short-
time longitudinal studies are necessary to identify changes 
and stable patterns in the importance of social media in 
politics.
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Abstract
The growing importance of social media in the political arena seems to be in line with the mediatization of politics thesis, which 
states that mediated communication is becoming more important in politics and increasingly influences political processes. 
However, how politicians’ social media activities and politicians’ perceptions concerning social media have developed 
over time has rarely been examined. Moreover, it is unclear how the politicians’ activities and perceptions are related to 
each other. Referring to theoretical approaches, such as the influence of presumed influence approach, four surveys were 
conducted among German parliamentarians (MPs) between 2012 and 2016 (n = 194/149/170/118). The results indicate that 
the MPs’ self-reported social media activities and perceptions have remained remarkably constant since 2012. Regression 
analyses indicate that MPs’ self-reported social media activities and perceptions are hardly related to each other. This raises 
the question whether mediatization processes are indeed driven by politicians’ perceptions about media influences.
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Since it has become widely accepted that mediatization is 
less fostered by media and rather by individuals (Schulz, 
2014), there is a shift from a “media-centric” to an “actor- 
centric” perspective in mediatization research (Esser & 
Strömbäck, 2014, p. 227). In particular, politicians’ percep-
tions and politicians’ media activities as well as the relation-
ship between both factors often served as indicators of the 
extent to which politics is mediatized (e.g., Cohen, Tsfati, & 
Sheafer, 2008; Kepplinger, 2002; Strömbäck, 2011). These 
indicators, with a focus on social media, were also used in this 
study. The study is based on data from four surveys conducted 
between 2012 and 2016 among members of Germany’s 
national parliament (MPs) and asks how have the German 
MPs’ self-reported social media activities and perceptions 
changed over time, and how have the German MPs’ social 
media activities been affected by their perceptions? Thus, the 
study supplements the few longitudinal studies that have 
investigated the process of the mediatization of politics 
(Elmelund-Præstekær et al., 2011; Kepplinger, 2002; Negrine, 
1999; Pontzen, 2013; Zeh & Hopmann, 2013). Furthermore, to 
the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study which analyzes 
the influence of perceptions about media influences on one’s 
own self-reported media activities over time (cf. “influence of 
presumed influence,” Gunther & Storey, 2003). This allows 
investigating whether mediatization processes are indeed 
“driven to a large extent by politicians’ perceptions that media 
have a powerful influence on politics” (Tsfati, 2014, p. 572).
Mediatization of Politics
Mediatization of politics can be defined as “a long-term pro-
cess through which the importance of media and their spill-
over effects on political processes, institutions, organizations 
and actors have increased” (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014, p. 6). 
Following Strömbäck (2008), this process can be differentiated 
in four highly related phases. The phases refer (1) to which 
degree the media constitute the dominant source of political 
information, (2) to which degree the media have become inde-
pendent from political institutions, (3) to which degree the 
media coverage is mainly governed by the media logic instead 
of the political logic, and (4) to which degree political actors 
are governed by the media logic instead of the political logic. 
While the first two phases are largely completed in most west-
ern European democracies (Maurer & Pfetsch, 2014, p. 340), it 
is unclear to what extent the third and fourth phases are devel-
oped. In this study, the fourth phase of mediatization is ana-
lyzed, which “deals with the very essence of the mediatization 
of politics” (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014, p. 6).
Fourth Phase of Mediatization: The Role of News 
Media
Studies focusing on the fourth phase of mediatization examine 
to what degree political actors are guided by the media logic 
instead of the political logic (for the theoretical discussion of 
the political and media logic, see, for example, Altheide & 
Snow, 1979; Esser, 2013; Lundby, 2009). Most of these studies 
have analyzed the impact of the news media logic, and thus, the 
impact of “media-specific rules of selecting, interpreting, and 
constructing political news messages” (Esser, 2013, p. 160). If 
politicians create, for example, pseudo-events or change their 
language style in favor of the news media’s needs, they follow 
(news) media logic rather than the political logic (Esser, 2013; 
Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). This form of self-mediatization 
(e.g., Esser, 2013) is only rational, if political actors perceive 
that the content that is distributed via news media influences 
relevant target groups (Donges & Jarren, 2014; Strömbäck, 
2011; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). Thus, “the first aspect of 
mediatization is perception” (Donges & Jarren, 2014, p. 189).
Empirical studies on the mediatization processes among 
politicians have analyzed the politicians’ media activities, 
perceptions, and the relationship between both factors. 
Kepplinger (2002), for example, shows that the quantity of 
German MPs’ information-related activities has increased 
over time, while their decision-making activities remained 
rather constant. According to Pontzen (2013), the number of 
press releases, interviews, and media trainings of German 
MPs significantly increased from 2005 to 2011.
Most politicians perceive that the mass media have some 
or great influence over politics (Strömbäck, 2011), can 
“make and break politicians” (Strömbäck, 2011; van Aelst 
et al., 2008), are important on diverse stages of the political 
process (Fawzi, 2018), and rather set the political agenda 
than politics itself (van Aelst & Walgrave, 2011). Moreover, 
a majority of Dutch politicians perceived that other politi-
cians would do anything to get media coverage (Brants, de 
Vreese, Möller, & van Praag, 2010), and German MPs stated 
that the media have more influence on candidates’ recruit-
ment than in the past (Pontzen, 2013). According to the 
“influence of presumed influence” approach (Gunther & 
Storey, 2003), these perceptions have consequences: indi-
viduals who perceive strong media influences on others react 
to these perceptions and change their attitudes or behaviors. 
This assumption was, for example, confirmed in a study 
among Israeli MPs (Cohen et al., 2008): their media-related 
activities were influenced by their perception that the media 
have a strong political influence on the public.
Taken together, politicians perceive that the media have a 
strong influence on politics and react by investing more time 
in media-related activities. However, most studies are based 
on cross-sectional data (but see, e.g., Kepplinger, 2002) and 
analyze either politicians’ perceptions or activities (but see, 
e.g., Cohen et al., 2008). Moreover, these results cannot sim-
ply be transferred to social media, as these platforms have a 
different media logic.
Fourth Phase of Mediatization: The Role of Social 
Media
Citizens across countries increasingly use social media as a 
source to receive news, and many social media users in coun-
tries such as the United States (54%), the United Kingdom 
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(42%), and Germany (25%) followed at least one political 
party or politician (Newman et al., 2017, pp. 12, 17). 
Politicians, in turn, have adopted social media within short 
time periods. For example, Facebook adoption among the 
major party candidates for the United States Congress 
increased remarkably from 2006 to 2012 (Gulati & Williams, 
2013). Finally, many journalists conduct a daily social media 
monitoring and increasingly include social media content 
from politicians and other actors in their news reports (e.g., 
Broersma & Graham, 2013).
These examples show that political communication pro-
cesses have rapidly changed. However, as the news media 
still dominate political information and communication (e.g., 
Newman et al., 2017), Chadwick (2013) argued that the con-
temporary media system has evolved to a hybrid media sys-
tem. “The hybrid media system is based upon conflict and 
competition between older and newer media logics but it also 
features important pockets of interdependence among these 
logics” (Chadwick, 2013, p. 207). Politicians need to adopt 
both media logics to succeed in this media environment. 
Klinger and Svensson (2015, 2016) have carved out the dif-
ferences between the ideal types of news media logic and 
network media logic (for an alternative conceptualization, 
see, van Dijck & Poell, 2013). They focused on the differ-
ences regarding production content, distribution of informa-
tion, and media usage. Contrary to the news media logic, the 
network media logic is much more based on amateurs who 
produce content based on their own interests and based on 
the anticipated interests of fragmented publics. The distribu-
tion of information is based on virality, which means that 
users distribute popular content with like-minded others, 
who possibly share this content within their network. Finally, 
contrary to the news media audience, the social media audi-
ence is more fragmented, interactive, and bound to networks 
of peers or interests, which enables a high level of selective 
exposure.
Politicians can address these fragmented social media 
audiences directly with their messages. Popularity cues, such 
as the number of likes, shares, or retweets, give politicians 
hints as to who and how many individuals of a specific audi-
ence receive these messages and “what content and presenta-
tions techniques ‘work’ online” (D’heer, 2018, p. 177). 
However, as it is “nearly impossible to determine the actual 
audience” (Litt, 2012, p. 312), politicians communicate to an 
“imagined audience” (e.g., Litt, 2012). This imagined audi-
ence can be differentiated in an abstract audience and spe-
cific target audiences (Litt & Hargittai, 2016) with whom 
politicians should communicate for several reasons.
Assuming that politicians want to be (re-)elected, they 
need to convince as many citizens as possible to vote for 
them in the next election. Thus, politicians should address 
the rather abstract audience of “the general public.” However, 
this general public more frequently receives political infor-
mation from news media than from social media (Newman 
et al., 2017). Because journalists, as gatekeepers of the news 
media, also monitor social media platforms and include 
social media content in their coverage (e.g., Broersma & 
Graham, 2013), they are an important target audience of pol-
iticians’ social media activities. Another important target 
audience are the politicians’ voters. First, politicians need to 
communicate with their voters, because former voters have 
to be persuaded to vote again for the politician. Second, poli-
ticians’ voters or followers may interact with the politicians’ 
messages (Kalsnes, Larsson, & Enli, 2017), which increases 
the virality of these messages. Finally, other politicians are 
an important target audience. For example, in party-centered 
political systems such as Germany, political parties and their 
members primarily determine the chances of politicians get-
ting a parliamentary seat by deciding about a politician’s 
position on the party list. German MPs are aware of this and 
accordingly perceive that relationships within one’s own 
party are a very important factor for political success 
(Pontzen, 2013).
Hypotheses
Empirical studies show that the majority of politicians have 
adopted social media within short time periods (e.g., Gibson 
& McAllister, 2015; Gulati & Williams, 2013). However, 
many politicians use social media only occasionally and less 
in an interactive way (e.g., Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; 
Nuernbergk & Conrad, 2016; Pontzen, 2013), with usage 
decreasing shortly after election campaigns (e.g., Enli & 
Skogerbø, 2013; Nuernbergk & Conrad, 2016). Furthermore, 
politicians adapt and use Facebook and Twitter in different 
ways (e.g., Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; Larsson & Kalsnes, 
2014; Quinlan, Gummer, Roßmann, & Wolf, 2018). Since 
most of these studies did not have a longitudinal design, it is 
unclear if and how fast social mediatization processes take 
place. Moreover, these studies did not argue from a mediati-
zation perspective and did not consider the specifics of the 
network media logic. However, based on these results and 
according to the mediatization of politics thesis, we assume 
that German MPs report that the amount of their social media 
activities changed over time:
H1. According to the German MPs’ self-reports, their 
Facebook and Twitter activities increased from 2012 to 
2016.
Although politicians or campaign managers perceive that 
traditional news media (e.g., television and newspapers) and 
traditional campaign tools (e.g., press releases) are more 
important or influential than social media, social media are 
attributed some or even great political influence (e.g., 
Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016; Lilleker, Tenscher, & Štětka, 
2015; Magin, Podschuweit, Haßler, & Russmann, 2017; 
Pontzen, 2013; Quinlan et al., 2018). In particular, “Facebook 
is a must have” for political parties (Magin et al., 2017, 
p. 1707), while Twitter is perceived as less influential 
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(e.g., Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016; Lilleker et al., 2015; 
Quinlan et al., 2018). Moreover, the politicians’ perception 
that Facebook is important significantly increased during 
the last years (e.g., Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016). It is likely 
that the perceived influence of Twitter is also increasing 
over time, particularly since politicians like Donald Trump 
detected Twitter as campaign tool. Thus, considering that 
social media have fragmented audiences and in line with the 
mediatization of politics thesis, we assume:
H2. According to the German MPs’ perceptions, the polit-
ical influence of Facebook and Twitter on (1) the general 
public, (2) journalists, (3) other politicians, and (4) their 
own voters increased from 2012 to 2016.
Finally, some studies have analyzed the influence of poli-
ticians’ perceptions on their social media activities. 
Politicians who strongly perceive that their voters, col-
leagues, and party expect that politicians should use social 
media are more likely to adopt social media (Hoffmann, 
Suphan, & Meckel, 2016). Politicians who perceive that 
social media are important in electoral campaigning increase 
their social media activities (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016). 
Focusing on the influence of presumed social media influ-
ence, studies indicate that the perceived influence of social 
media or the Internet on other politicians, citizens, and jour-
nalists partially affected politicians’ social media activities 
(e.g., Bernhard & Dohle, 2015; Metag & Marcinkowski, 
2012 for contrary results: e.g., Marcinkowski & Metag, 
2014). A longitudinal and largely context-independent analy-
sis should make these previous findings more robust and 
could show to what extent politicians’ self-mediatization in 
social media is affected by their perceptions regarding their 
imagined audiences. Thus, in line with the mediatization of 
politics thesis, it is hypothesized:
H3. The stronger German MPs perceived the political 
influence of Facebook and Twitter to be on (1) the general 
public, (2) journalists, (3) other politicians, and (4) their 
own voters between 2012 and 2016, the more extensively, 
according to their self-reports, they used Facebook and 
Twitter between 2012 and 2016.
Method
Procedure and Sample
To test the hypotheses, two standardized surveys were con-
ducted among the members of the 17th (spring 2012 and 
2013) and 18th German Bundestag (spring 2015 and 2016). 
At the time of the surveys, no national elections or other spe-
cific events occurred that could have distorted the responses.
To increase the number of participants, all MPs were 
invited to participate in the surveys. In addition, the respon-
dents were guaranteed absolute anonymity.1 The invitations 
were sent by letter. The questionnaire and a stamped return 
envelope were enclosed. The MPs were also able to complete 
the survey online. At 2 and 4 weeks after the invitation, 
reminder emails were sent.
In 2012, 194 members of the 17th German Bundestag par-
ticipated in the survey (response rate: 31.3%), while 149 
MPs took part in 2013 (24.0%). In 2015, 170 members of the 
18th German Bundestag participated (27.0%), while 118 
MPs participated in 2016 (18.6%).
Although the response rates varied over time, the sam-
ples were not biased with respect to sex and age (Table 1). 
With respect to party affiliation, the 2012 sample fitted well 
to the entire Bundestag. In 2013, 2015, and 2016, MPs of the 
Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social 
Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU) were underrepresented. 
Social Democrats were overrepresented in 2013 and 2016, 
while members of the Left Party were overrepresented in 
2015 and 2016.
Measures
The study was part of a larger research project. Therefore, 
not all characteristics of mediatization could be addressed in 
the surveys. Moreover, the concept of the network media 
logic was not yet developed when conducting the first sur-
veys. Thus, if we would design the surveys today, some 
questions would be added and some question wordings 
would be adjusted. However, to maintain the longitudinal 
character of the study, most questions were not adjusted 
between the surveys.
German MPs’ Self-Reported Social Media Activities. In each sur-
vey, the MPs were asked how often they used Facebook and 
Twitter (1) to get political information and (2) to broadcast 
information about their political work. In the 2015 and 2016 
surveys, they were additionally asked how often they used 
Facebook and Twitter (3) to broadcast information about 
their everyday lives. All items were measured on five-level 
scales. To make the scales more comparable, all scales were 
slightly adjusted in 2015 and 2016 (2012/2013: 1 = never to 
5 = daily [get information] and 1 = not at all to 5 = very inten-
sive [broadcast information about political work]; 2015/2016: 
1 = never to 5 = very frequently).
German MPs’ Perceptions About the Political Influence of Social 
Media. MPs were asked in each survey how strongly they 
believed the political influence of (1) Facebook and (2) Twit-
ter to be on (a) the general public, (b) journalists, and (c) 
other politicians. In 2015 and 2016, MPs were also asked to 
assess the political influence of Facebook and Twitter on (d) 
their own voters (all items: five-level scales: 1 = no influence 
to 5 = very strong influence).
Covariates. In addition to sex, age, and party affiliation, the 
MPs’ perceptions about the reach and suitability of social 
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media were requested, because these perceptions also seem 
to influence political actors’ social media activities (e.g., 
Kelm, Dohle, & Bernhard, 2017). Thus, the MPs were asked 
to estimate how many people in Germany (in each survey), 
journalists, politicians, and their own voters (in 2015 and 
2016) used Facebook and Twitter to receive political infor-
mation. The items were measured on five-level scales 
(2012/2013: 1 = very few people to 5 = very many people; 
2015/2016: 1 = almost no one to 5 = almost all). Moreover, 
the MPs were asked how suitable they considered Facebook 
and Twitter to be for getting political information (in each 
survey) and for broadcasting information about their own 
political work (in 2015 and 2016; all items: five-level scale; 
1 = not suitable at all to 5 = very suitable).
Results
German MPs’ Self-Reported Social Media 
Activities
It was hypothesized that German MPs’ self-reported 
Facebook and Twitter activities increased from 2012 to 2016 
(H1). However, according to the MPs’ answers, their social 
media activities were rather constant (Table 2).
Using Facebook and Twitter to receive political informa-
tion did not increase over time. Instead, German MPs stated 
that their Facebook usage for this purpose significantly 
decreased between 2013 and 2015, but reached the former 
level in 2016. The MPs’ self-reported Facebook usage for 
broadcasting information about their own political work sig-
nificantly increased between 2012 and 2015 and remained at 
a high level in 2016. In contrast, using Twitter to broadcast 
information remained at a consistently lower level. In 2015 
and 2016, the MPs were also asked how often they broad-
casted information about their everyday lives via Facebook 
and Twitter, with the results indicating that they rarely used 
Facebook and Twitter for this purpose. For all purposes, 
German MPs stated that they used Facebook more frequently 
than Twitter.
Taken together, according to the MPs, only broadcasting 
information about their own political work via Facebook 
noticeably increased in the observed period. However, MPs’ 
self-reported intensity of other social media activities hardly 
changed between 2012 and 2016. Thus, H1 has to be rejected.
German MPs’ Perceptions About the Political 
Influence of Social Media
It was hypothesized that the German MPs’ perceptions about 
the political influence of Facebook and Twitter on the (1) 
general public, (2) journalists, (3) other politicians, and (4) 
their own voters increased from 2012 to 2016 (H2). However, 
in most instances, the perceived influence of Facebook and 
Twitter remained more or less constant (Table 3).
The perceived political influence of Facebook on the gen-
eral public was significantly lower in 2015 than in 2012/2013, 
but reached the former level in 2016. Politicians’ perceived 
political influence of Facebook on journalists decreased 
from 2013 to 2015/2016. The perceived political influence of 
Facebook on politicians and their own voters did not change 
in the observed period.
The perceived political influence of Twitter on the general 
public decreased from 2012/2013 to 2015, and the perceived 
political influence of Twitter on other politicians increased from 
2012 to 2013. However, both perceptions reached the former 
level in the following years. Regarding the perceived political 












2016 (n = 630)
Sex
 Female 27.8 29.5 32.9 38.7 38.8 36.8
 Male 72.2 70.5 67.1 61.3 61.2 63.2
Year of birth
 1950 or earlier 25.8 23.8 21.3 6.1 5.5 9.0
 1951-1960 29.0 33.8 34.0 33.5 38.2 33.0
 1961-1970 29.0 25.4 27.6 33.5 37.3 33.7
 1971-1980 14.8 15.4 15.2 19.4 13.6 18.9
 1981 or later 1.3 1.5 1.9 5.8 5.5 5.4
Party affiliation
 CDU/CSU 38.6 29.2 38.2 39.3 36.3 49.2
 SPD 23.9 30.6 23.6 32.1 38.1 30.6
 FDP 17.4 18.1 15.0  
 Left Party 13.0 15.3 12.3 19.0 16.8 10.2
 Alliance 90/The Greens 7.1 6.9 11.0 9.5 8.8 10.0
CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria; SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany; FDP: Free Democratic 
Party.
All values in the table are in percentages.
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influence of Twitter on journalists, the MPs’ perceptions did not 
change in the observed period. In contrast, German MPs’ per-
ceptions about the political influence of Twitter on their own 
voters significantly increased from 2015 to 2016.
Taken together, the German MPs’ perceptions about the 
political influence of social media hardly changed between 
2012 and 2016. Thus, H2 has to be rejected.
However, looking at those respondents who observed a 
strong social media influence (for a similar proceeding, see, 
for example, Fawzi, 2018; Strömbäck, 2011; van Aelst et al., 
2008), the picture is different. The proportion of German 
MPs who perceived a (very) strong influence of Twitter on 
the general public (+83.0%), journalists (+63.1%), politi-
cians (+93.3%), and their own voters (+109.0%) strongly 
increased from 2012 to 2016. This trend is not visible on 
average, because the proportion of those MPs who perceived 
Twitter as not or slightly influential decreased by only 13.3% 
on average in the observed period. However, the proportion 
of those who perceived a strong influence of Facebook on 
the general public (–39.4%), journalists (–1.8%), politicians 
(+11.4%), and their own voters (+3.2%) decreased or did not 
change notably from 2012 to 2016.
Influence of German MPs’ Social Media 
Perceptions on Their Self-Reported Social Media 
Activities
To test to what extent the self-reported Facebook and 
Twitter activities of German MPs were affected by their 
perceptions about the influence of Facebook and Twitter on 
the (1) general public, (2) journalists, (3) other politicians, 
and (4) their own voters (H3), hierarchical linear regression 
analyses were calculated with the data from all surveys. 
The German MPs’ perceptions about the influence of 
Facebook and Twitter on the general public, journalists, 
politicians, and their own voters served as the independent 
variables. The frequency of the MPs’ self-reported 
Facebook and Twitter usage to broadcast information about 
their own political work served as dependent variables. 
Sex, age, education, party affiliation, the perceived reach, 
and the perceived suitability of Facebook and Twitter 
served as covariates.2
Table 4 indicates to what extent the German MPs’ self-
reported Facebook activities were influenced by their per-
ceptions about the political influence of Facebook on their 
target groups. In almost all cases, there was no relationship 
between the German MPs’ perceived political influence and 
their self-reported Facebook activities. The only significant 
result is observed in 2015, where the German MPs’ self-
reported Facebook activities were positively influenced by 
their perception of Facebook’s political influence on their 
own voters (β = .23, p < .01).
The picture changes little when focussing on Twitter 
(Table 5). In almost all cases, the German MPs’ self-
reported Twitter activities were not affected by their per-
ceptions about the political influence of Twitter on their 
target groups. The only remarkable results are observed in 
2013, where the perceived political influence of Twitter on 
Table 2. Bundestag Members’ Self-Reported Social Media Activities.
2012 (n = 187-194) 2013 (n = 146-149) 2015 (n = 168-170) 2016 (n = 118)
Facebook usage . . .
. . . to get political information1 M 3.23a,b 3.50b 3.01a 3.16a,b
(SD) (1.59) (1.57) (1.29) (1.29)
. . . to broadcast information 
about own political work2
M 3.20a 3.60a,b 3.98b 3.98b
(SD) (1.46) (1.30) (1.25) (1.27)
. . . to broadcast information 
about own everyday life3
M 2.49a 2.35a
(SD) (1.44) (1.24)
Twitter usage . . .
. . . to get political information4 M 2.26a 2.33a 2.26a 2.39a
(SD) (1.60) (1.60) (1.47) (1.46)
. . . to broadcast information 
about own political work5
M 2.25a 2.42a 2.44a 2.32a
(SD) (1.57) (1.54) (1.63) (1.53)
. . . to broadcast information 
about own everyday life6
M 1.57a 1.58a
(SD) (1.06) (1.02)
Five-point scales: 2012/2013: to get political information: 1 = never to 5 = daily; 2012/2013: to broadcast information about own political work: 1 = not at all 
to 5 = very intensive; 2015/2016: all items: 1 = never to 5 = very frequently; mean estimates and standard deviations (in parentheses); ameans with same letters 
do not differ at p < .05 and bmeans with different letters differ at p < .05 (ANOVA with Scheffé post hoc tests).
1F(3, 625) = 3.06; p < .05; η² = .01.
2F(3, 626) = 13.17; p < .001; η² = .06.
3F(1, 284) = .81; p = .37; η² = .00.
4F(3, 619) = .22; p < .88; η² = .00.
5F(3, 615) = .55; p = .65; η² = .00.
6F(1, 284) = .01; p = .92; η² = .00.
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other politicians positively affected German MPs’ Twitter 
activities (β = .23, p < .05), and in 2016, where the perceived 
influence of Twitter on journalists had a positive impact 
(β = .26, p < .10).3
Taken together, the German MPs’ self-reported social 
media activities between 2012 and 2016 were hardly affected 
by their perceptions about the political influence of social 
media on their target groups. Thus, H3 has to be rejected.
The effects of some control variables partly confirm the 
results of other studies. The younger the MPs, the more they 
stated that they used Facebook and Twitter (see, e.g., Metag 
& Marcinkowski, 2012). MPs of the Greens stated that they 
used Twitter more frequently than MPs of other parties (see, 
e.g., Quinlan et al., 2018). The most consistent effect on the 
German MPs’ social media activities is exercised by the per-
ceived suitability of social media (see, e.g., Bernhard & 
Dohle, 2015; Kelm et al., 2017).
Discussion
Contemporary media systems and individuals’ media behav-
ior have changed rapidly since the emergence of social 
media. Within mediatization research, these developments 
were worked up in a theoretically meaningful way (e.g., 
Klinger & Svensson, 2015), but hardly considered empiri-
cally (but see, e.g., Olsson & Eriksson, 2016). Particularly, it 
is unclear how these developments have changed the media 
behavior and the perceptions of important political decision 
makers. Moreover, the few studies that have examined how 
politicians’ perceptions and social media activities are related 
have led to mixed results (e.g., Bernhard & Dohle, 2015; 
Metag & Marcinkowski, 2012). Thus, it is unclear to what 
extent perceptions are indeed a major driver of mediatiza-
tion processes (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Tsfati, 2014). This 
study addressed these research gaps by examining the 
Table 3. Bundestag Members’ Perceptions About the Political Influence of Social Media.
2012 (n = 186-192) 2013 (n = 144-147) 2015 (n = 160-169) 2016 (n = 93-117)
Perceived political influence of Facebook on . . .
. . . the general 
public
(Very) strong influence 28.2% 23.1% 10.7% 17.1%
M 2.97b 2.95b 2.64a 2.72a,b
(SD)1 (.97) (.85) (.77) (.86)
. . . journalists (Very) strong influence 33.1% 40.1% 32.0% 32.5%
M 3.09a,b 3.29b 2.91a 2.86a
(SD)2 (.94) (.91) (1.06) (1.05)
. . . politicians (Very) strong influence 24.6% 29.3% 22.5% 27.4%
M 2.90a 3.05a 2.78a 2.76a
(SD)3 (.92) (.87) (.96) (.99)
. . . own voters (Very) strong influence 31.5% 32.5%
M 3.10a 3.13a
(SD)4 (.86) (.91)
Perceived political influence of Twitter on . . .
. . . the general 
public
(Very) strong influence 5.3% 10.3% 3.1% 9.7%
M 2.29b 2.35b 2.02a 2.25a,b
(SD)5 (.75) (.85) (.74) (.92)
. . . journalists (Very) strong influence 29.0% 44.4% 41.6% 47.3%
M 2.96a 3.26a 3.12a 3.22a
(SD)6 (.97) (1.05) (1.12) (1.21)
. . . politicians (Very) strong influence 15% 31.7% 26.9% 29.0%
M 2.66a 2.99b 2.74a,b 2.86a,b
(SD)7 (.82) (.96) (1.09) (1.07)
. . . own voters (Very) strong influence 6.7% 14.0%
M 2.20a 2.46b
(SD)8 (.89) (1.03)
Five-point scales: 1 = no influence to 5 = very strong influence; percentages summarize both approving scale digits; ameans with same letters do not differ at 
p < .05 and bmeans with different letters differ at p < .05 (ANOVA with Scheffé post hoc tests).
1F(3, 621) = 6.00; p < .001; η² = .03.
2F(3, 619) = 5.67; p < .001; η² = .03.
3F(3, 620) = 2.97; p < .05; η² = .01.
4F(1, 283) = .10; p = .76; η² = .00.
5F(3, 583) = .06; p < .01; η² = .03.
6F(3, 580) = 2.46; p = .06; η² = .01.
7F(3, 584) = 3.38; p < .05; η² = .02.
8F(1, 254) = 4.69; p < .05; η² = .02.
8 Social Media + Society
development of German MPs’ self-reported social media 
activities and perceptions over time and by analyzing the 
relationship between politicians’ perceptions and self-
reported social media activities. Data from four surveys 
among German MPs between 2012 and 2016 were used.
It is striking that German MPs’ Facebook and Twitter 
activities remained largely constant from 2012 to 2016. Only 
the German MPs’ self-reported Facebook activities for 
broadcasting information about their own political work 
increased significantly in the observed period. On one hand, 
this consistent pattern was unexpected because the (political) 
online world has significantly changed in recent years (e.g., 
Vowe & Henn, 2016). For example, social media play an 
increasing role for political information (Newman et al., 
2017) as well as in other fields of public communication 
(e.g., Broersma & Graham, 2013). Moreover, a new kind of 
political actor was growing with the help of social media 
(e.g., Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017). On the other hand, 
the results could be explained by the fact that Facebook and 
Twitter were already the most prominent social media plat-
forms used by German MPs at least since 2012 (results not 
presented). Those who have used Facebook and Twitter since 
2012 may have established consistent routines that do not 
vary from one year to another. Moreover, as citizens have 
become accustomed to the MPs’ social media communica-
tion, MPs did not feel obliged to change their social media 
habits (Tromble, 2018).
Likewise, the German MPs’ perceptions regarding the 
political influence of Facebook and Twitter on their target 
groups, and thus on the general public, journalists, politi-
cians, and their own voters, hardly changed from 2012 to 
2016. There are some significant changes, but in most 
instances, these short-time peaks disappear in the following 
years. Again, a possible explanation for this consistency 
could be that Facebook and Twitter were already well estab-
lished in 2012, and MPs have not changed their perceptions 
regarding social media since that time. Moreover, since the 
mediatization of politics is not a linear process (e.g., 
Strömbäck, 2011, p. 426), short-time upswings and down-
swings are expectable.
Nevertheless, the picture becomes less clear when look-
ing at those respondents who perceived a (very) strong politi-
cal influence of social media on their target groups. While 
the proportion of those respondents who perceived a (very) 
Table 4. Influence of Bundestag Members’ Perceptions on the Self-Reported Intensity of Their Facebook Activities to Broadcast 
Political Information.
2012 (n = 146) 2013 (n = 125) 2015 (n = 147) 2016 (n = 106)
Sex (1 = female) −.06 −.08 .05 .01
Age −.39*** −.20* −.22** −.22*
Education years .05 .07 .05 −.06
Party affiliation (reference: CDU/CSU)
 SPD .18* −.07 .21* .03
 Alliance 90/The Greens .17* −.04 .10 .16
 Left Party .02 .16# .08 .01
 FDP .08 .17#  
Perceived reach of Facebook among . . .
. . . the general public −.06 .09 −.05 −.02
. . . journalists .09 .05
. . . politicians .03 .01
. . . own voters −.01 −.10
Perceived suitability of Facebook . . .
. . . to get political information .39*** .26** −.01 .06
. . . to broadcast information 
about own political work
.34*** .26*
R² .39*** .29*** .33*** .21**
Perceived political influence of Facebook on . . .
. . . the general public −.07 −.00 −.12 .10
. . . journalists .02 .11 .00 −.04
. . . politicians .03 −.06 −.01 .13
. . . own voters .23** .06
Change R² .00 .01 .04 .03
Total R² .39*** .30*** .36*** .28*
CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria; SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany; FDP: Free Democratic 
Party.
Standardized beta coefficients: #p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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strong political influence of Facebook on their target groups 
has also not changed or even decreased over time, the pro-
portion of those respondents who perceived a (very) strong 
political influence of Twitter on their target groups has 
increased by 87.1% on average. This indicates a digital 
divide in German MPs’ Twitter perceptions. While, on one 
hand, more and more German MPs perceived Twitter as 
(very) influential, on the other hand, the proportion of those 
who perceived Twitter as not or slightly influential decreased 
only slowly. In other words, although more and more German 
MPs “believe in Twitter,” there is a relatively constant pro-
portion of parliamentarians who are rather skeptical about 
Twitter’s political influence. This digital divide of politi-
cians’ Twitter perceptions is not yet mirrored in politicians’ 
Twitter activities. But if perceptions are indeed “the first 
aspect of mediatization” (Donges & Jarren, 2014, p. 189), 
Twitter will become more important for German MPs in the 
future, while the relevance of Facebook is likely to remain 
similar or even to decrease.
The third hypothesis assumed, in line with the influence 
of presumed influence approach (Gunther & Storey, 2003), 
that German MPs’ self-reported social media activities 
are influenced by their perceptions about the social media 
influence on mentioned target groups. The findings indicate 
that politicians’ perceptions about the social media influence 
are largely independent from their social media activities. 
The few significant findings should not be overstated, espe-
cially since the findings are not based on one specific inde-
pendent variable (e.g., the perceived influence on journalists). 
Thus, the results raise two questions. The first question is 
whether mediatization processes are indeed driven by politi-
cians’ perceptions about media influences. While percep-
tions about media influences seem to be a relevant driver in 
the offline world (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008), these perceptions 
seem to have little or no impact in the online world (e.g., 
Marcinkowski & Metag, 2014; Metag & Marcinkowski, 
2012). One reason could be that the news media logic and the 
network media logic imply very different affordances. For 
decades, politicians have internalized the affordances of the 
news media logic and therefore act strategically in the offline 
world. However, politicians still try to understand the net-
work media logic and use social media rather as a playground 
than as a strategic communication platform. Since the net-
work media logic is in flux and will develop new affordances 
as technology changes, politicians are likely to continue to 
lag behind these developments in the future.
Table 5. Influence of Bundestag Members’ Perceptions on the Self-Reported Intensity of Their Twitter Activities to Broadcast Political 
Information.
2012 (n = 138) 2013 (n = 120) 2015 (n = 136) 2016 (n = 83)
Sex (1 = female) −.13 .12 .01 −.01
Age −.37*** −.23** −.00 −.09
Education years .00 .00 −.04 .09
Party affiliation (reference: CDU/CSU)
 SPD .07 .11 .02 .04
 Alliance 90/The Greens .21** .05 .18* .07
 Left Party −.07 −.02 −.03 .11
 FDP −.07 .13  
Perceived reach of Twitter among . . .
. . . the general public .13 .05 −.05 −.06
. . . journalists .13 −.09
. . . politicians .07 −.11
. . . own voters −.06 .13
Perceived suitability of Twitter . . .
. . . to get political information .33*** .49*** .36*** .41**
. . . to broadcast information 
about own political work
.28* .28*
Change R² .39*** .45*** .48*** .52***
Perceived political influence of Twitter on . . .
. . . the general public −.07 −.06 −.07 .01
. . . journalists −.08 −.12 −.03 .26#
. . . politicians .10 .23* .02 −.09
. . . own voters .01 −.04
Change R² .01 .02 .00 .02
Total R² .40*** .47*** .48*** .54***
CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria; SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany; FDP: Free Democratic Party.
Standardized beta coefficients: #p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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The second question is what motives politicians have to 
use social media. Maybe perceptions and activities are still 
somehow related to each other, but politicians do not change 
their social media activities automatically when they per-
ceive a growing influence of a social media platform. 
Instead, they might observe the developments and perhaps 
adapt their social media activities at later times or occasions 
(e.g., election campaigns). Another explanation could be 
that politicians use social media just because they want to 
present themselves “as being modern, open minded, and up-
to-date” (Marcinkowski & Metag, 2014, p. 161). Moreover, 
politicians may have intrinsic motives to use social media. 
Some studies, for example, indicate that politicians also use 
social media simply for having fun or passing time (e.g., 
Hoffmann et al., 2016). However, the strongest and most 
consistent effect on the German MPs’ self-reported social 
media activities was the perceived suitability to get and 
broadcast political information via Facebook and Twitter. 
This indicates a rather strategic use. Obviously, further stud-
ies are needed that focus on the motives of politicians’ social 
media activities.
This study has limitations. The results were based on self-
reports by the MPs, which is problematic for several reasons. 
First, MPs’ staff often co-curate politicians’ social media com-
munication. Thus, it is unclear to what extent politicians can 
correctly assess the nature and intensity of their social media 
activities. Although German politicians state that they have con-
trol over their social media communication (Meckel, Hoffmann, 
Suphan, & Poëll, 2013, p. 4), this perception could also be 
biased. Second, the respondents may have brightened the fre-
quency of their social media activities (social desirability) 
although absolute anonymity was guaranteed. In addition, poli-
ticians may have changed their attitudes toward a socially 
acceptable intensity of social media usage over the years. As a 
consequence, politicians may have overstated their social media 
activities in some years and understated their activities in other 
years. For this reasons, further research should try to avoid mea-
suring social media by self-reports, especially if the activities 
leave “digital trace data” (Jungherr, 2015). Instead, further 
research should use scraping tools, which were developed in 
recent years (e.g., Keyling & Jünger, 2016).
Another limitation was that not all items were queried in 
all surveys. In addition, the constructs were partly measured 
in slightly different ways, which might have distorted the 
comparisons over the years.
Moreover, the element of change, which is inherent for 
mediatization, could not be addressed in the items directly. In 
addition, some activities and perceptions that address the speci-
ficity of network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015) or 
social media logic (van Dijck & Poell, 2013) could not be take 
into account, because these logics were not developed in 2012. 
Future research should consider these logics and their specific 
characteristics more clearly when developing their study 
designs (e.g., Olsson & Eriksson, 2016). Especially, other 
researchers are encouraged to develop survey questions that 
could measure social mediatization in cross-national and longi-
tudinal study designs. How often, for example, have MPs con-
sidered information in their decision processes that they have 
obtained via social media? To what extent are politicians trying 
to create messages that “go viral?” And do politicians use the 
features of social media to address different target groups?
Finally, future research should consider that in the hybrid 
media system, the mass media logic and the network media 
logic overlap (Chadwick, 2013) and therefore compare politi-
cians’ perceptions and activities in traditional and social media.
Despite these limitations, the data provide a valid overview 
of how a group central to German politics, members of the 
German Bundestag, state to use and perceive social media 
platforms. These aspects were measured four times, and 
changes were traced over a period of 5 years. Thus, the study 
contributes to the few empirical studies that considered the 
process character of mediatization (e.g., Kepplinger, 2002). 
Moreover, the study enriches the literature on MPs’ motiva-
tions for online activities by revealing the extent to which 
social media activities are influenced by subjective percep-
tions. Other researchers are encouraged to analyze MPs’ social 
media communication in different national contexts to make 
changes in political communication in the online world more 
visible.
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Notes
1. While this sampling strategy can be considered as a suitable 
way to increase the response rate, it also has negative impli-
cations. Particularly, due to the anonymity, the respondents’ 
answers could not be linked to their actual activities, which 
could have been additionally assessed by content analysis.
2. The perceptions about the influence, reach, and suitability 
are related to each other. However, bivariate analyses using 
the data from each year indicated only moderate relationships 
between these perceptions. Moreover, as all tolerance values 
are above .30 and all variance inflation factors (VIF) are below 
3.50, there should be no problem with multicollinearity.
3. Further analyses were carried out in which the control vari-
ables were kept constant. However, the effects of the indepen-
dent variables did not change.
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